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Abstract
Principles for a Post New Deal Employment Policy
Despite a decade or more of extensive innovation in human resource and labor
management practices in leading firms, the American economy has yet to observe sufficient
diffusion of innovations to produce improvements in macro economic performance or
worker economic or social welfare. This paper analyzes the reasons for limited diffusion
and outlines a strategy for overcoming the systemic obstacles limiting widespread and
sustained human resource innovation. These obstacles include market failures,
characteristics of capital markets and firm-level governance structures that limit time
horizons and investments in human resources, growing adversarial relations between labor
and management, weakness in industry and national institutional infrastructures, and the
lack of a coherent national human resource and employment policy.
A Mutual Gains employment policy is proposed that seeks to overcome these
obstacles and extends the results of private sector experiments. This policy would go beyond
the New Deal labor policies by taking steps to encourage private sector firms to adopt
human resource strategies that produce sustained improvements in productivity and living
conditions. The key components to this policy include:
1). Tax incentives to promote greater investment in human resources;
2). Establishment of human resource councils within firms to both elevate the
influence of human resources in corporate governance and strategy and to help
implement and administer mutual gains policies;
3). Transformation of labor laws designed reverse the cycle of adversarial labor-
management relations and fill the void left by the decline of traditional unions with
forms of employee participation and representation that facilitate mutual gains
strategies;
4). Development of the data and analytic capacity within government and the
academic research community needed to support and evaluate employment policies
and firm level human resource practices.
III
One of the hallmarks of the prior generations of industrial relations researchers was
their contributions to the development and analysis of public policies that regulate
employment relationships. 1 The field of industrial relations was born out of the efforts of
an early generation of institutional labor economists to find better ways to address the labor
problems they observed in the early part of this century. Their work eventually provided
the intellectual foundation for the New Deal labor policies and industrial relations system.
This tradition was carried on by the next generation of institutional economists who used
their experiences with the War Labor Board to help develop and apply the principles
guiding collective bargaining and labor policy in the post war era. These two generations
of scholars shared the view that government had an important role to play in protecting
labor standards and regulating the rules of the game governing employee-employer relations.
Unfortunately, these views have been largely ignored in policy making circles in
recent years. Instead, the past decade saw a return to a laissez faire labor and employment
policy and a resurgence in neo-classical economics as the dominant intellectual framework
guiding employment policy. Public policy makers were largely passive observers in the 1980s
as management and labor in the private sector engaged in far reaching trial and error efforts
to update and transform their practices to accommodate changes in their product and labor
markets. As a result, while significant innovations were initiated, they have yet to diffuse
'To avoid confusion I will use the terms "employment policy" or "employment relations"
to include what conventionally has been variously labeled labor, industrial relations, human
resource management or policy. In this paper, as in all research in this tradition dating back
to the origins of the field discussed here, the domain of interest is broad, encompassing all
aspects of the employment relationship and the parties (workers, managers, labor
representatives, government policy makers, etc.) who influence its institutions, policies, and
outcomes.
to the point where their potential benefits to the macro economy and society are realized.
While we in the research community have studied and debated the implications of
changes in private practice for both theory and practice, (see for example, Freeman and
Medoff, 1984; Piore and Sabel, 1985; Kochan, Katz, and McKersie, 1986; Derber, 1982;
Barbash, 1980; Lewin, 1987; Dunlop, 1989; Freedman, 1989; Chelius and Dworkin, 1990)
we have yet to fully explore the implications of these changes for the role of government as
an actor in employment relationships. Although a number of us believe that the New Deal
labor policies are no longer sufficient or adequate for today's economy and workforce (see
for example Weiler, 1990; Kochan and McKersie, 1988; Heckscher, 1987; Marshall, 1987;
Lawler, 1990) we have yet to articulate a convincing intellectual framework or set of
principles to replace the New Deal model.
This essay sketches out a framework for a post New Deal employment policy that
builds on the institutionalists' perspective toward the labor market. But it goes beyond that
perspective by building on the lessons learned from the private experimentation of the past
decade. The key extension of the New Deal approach is to suggest that contemporary
employment policy needs to support innovations in private practice that can create mutual
or joint gains (Walton, 1986) in employment relationships. The central argument is that if
widely adopted, these innovations and others that will follow can contribute to the twin
macro economic and social objectives of enhancing the competitiveness of the economy and
promoting improvements in the standard of living. To achieve these twin objectives will,
however require breaking with the past decade's passive approach to employment policy.
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The Need for a New Employment Policy
Over the course of the past decade recognition that changes in the international and
domestic economy are challenging a host of traditional American policies and practices led
to the formation of a large number of competitiveness, productivity or similarly focused
commissions and study groups. These groups covered the broad political spectrum ranging
from President Reagan's Council on Competitiveness (now a private group) to Governor
Cuomo's Commission on Trade and Competitiveness, to groups led by leading faculty
members at universities such as Carnegie-Mellon, California at Berkeley, Harvard, and MIT,
to labor-management groups such as the Collective Bargaining Forum.2 In addition to
these broad based commissions, five former Secretaries of Labor led or organized national
commissions and studies aimed at identifying the implications of changes in the economy
and the workforce for the future of labor and human resource policy and practice. 3
A number of common rhetorical points can be found in each of these reports. First,
there is a general recognition that the central economic and social policy challenge facing
2See for example, the various reports of the Berkeley Roundtable on International
Trade, The Cuomo Commission Report on Trade and Competitiveness . (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1988),Michael L. Dertouzos, Richard K. Lester, and Robert M. Solow, Made
in America (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989; Two reports of the Collective Bargaining
Forum, New Directions for Labor and Management (1988) and A Social Compact for Labor
and Management (1990), (Washington, D.C. U.S. Department of Labor).
3See for example Work Force 2000 (Johnston and Packer, 1987), a report of the Hudson
Institute prepared for the U.S. Department of Labor, 1987; America's Choice: High Skills
or Low Wages, Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce (Rochester, NY,
National Center on Education and the Economy, 1990); Investing in People. Final Report
of the Secretary of Labor's Commission on Labor Force Quality and Labor Market
Efficiency, 1989; and the forthcoming report of the Secretary of Labor's National
Commission on Work Based Learning.
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the U.S. today is to restore the competitiveness of U.S. industries and firms in world markets
while simultaneously reversing the erosion in American standards of living experienced in
the past decade. Second, there is an equally general recognition that to achieve these twin
objectives will require that U.S. firms gain competitive advantage from the quality and
utilization of their human resources. Moreover, most of these reports go on to argue that
the key micro-economic strategy for achieving these objectives lies in improving the long
term rate of productivity growth since productivity growth is a necessary condition for
improving real wages and living standards. But these reports add new dimensions to the on
concept of productivity (cf Cyert and Mowery, 1986; Dertouzos, Solow, and Lester, 1988).
In today's economy productivity means more than simply output per work hour. It must also
encompass the production of high quality goods and services and the capacity to innovate
and adapt quickly to new technologies and market opportunities.
These reports also normally note that meeting these new productivity and quality
imperatives will require significant investments in human resources and sustained
cooperation and innovation in labor-management relations. Achieving world class levels of
quality and productivity requires organizations that achieve high levels of skill, motivation,
participation, and trust from their workforce. Here is where the lessons of the innovative
side of private sector labor and human resource practices of the past decade enter into the
rhetoric. Although the specifics vary from industry to industry and firm to firm, the contours
of the type of organization capable of eliciting this type of sustained mutual commitment
to high levels of investment in human resources in return for high levels of trust and
motivation usually involve some variation on the following principles:
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a. The firm competes the basis of product quality and differentiation as well as
price.
b. Human resource considerations weigh heavily in corporate strategic decision
making and governance processes. Employee interests are represented through the
voice of the human resource staff professionals and/ or employee representatives
consult and participate with senior executives in decisions that affect human resource
policies and employee interests. In either case, employees are treated as legitimate
stakeholders in the corporation.
c. Investments in new hardware or physical technology are combined with the
investments in human resources and changes in organizational practices required to
realize the full potential benefits of these investments.
d. The firm sustains a high level of investment in training, skill development, and
education and personnel practices are designed to capture and utilize these skills
fully.
e. Compensation and reward systems are internally equitable, competitive, and
linked to the long term performance of the firm.
f. Employment continuity and security is an important priority and value to be
considered in all corporate decisions and policies.
g. Workplace relations encourage flexibility in the organization of work,
empowerment of employees to solve problems, and high levels of trust among
workers, supervisors, and managers.
h. Worker rights to representation are acknowledged and respected. Union or other
employee representatives are treated as joint partners in designing and overseeing
innovations in labor and human resource practices.
These arguments are grounded in the innovations introduced by a number of leading
firms and unions in the 1980s. The primary lesson from these experiments and the research
that evaluated them is that a mutual gains employment relationship is possible to construct
and, that when in place, employees respond favorably to it.
Yet there is another side to the reality of the past decade's experience that the policy
making community has not yet been willing to face. These innovative practices and high
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rates of investment in human resources are limited to a small segment of the economy,
difficult to sustain or institutionalize, and not diffusing. Instead, the majority of employment
relationships are going in the exact opposite direction called for by the conclusions and
recommendations of these commissions and study groups.
Despite the calls for increased commitment to training, comparisons between the
level of public and/or private firm investment in human resources in the U.S. lags that of
Germany and Japan (Kochan and Osterman, 1991; MacDuffie and Kochan, 1991). While
U.S. firms have been estimated to spend more than $30 billion annually on training
(Carnevale, 1990), in reality this amounts to less than two percent of total private sector
compensation. The vast majority of these training dollars are spent by large firms on
management development. The reality is that investments in training are not a widespread
phenomenon but concentrated on executives and managers in large, elite firms.
The same is true for sustained labor management cooperation. While the 1980s were
a decade of profound innovation in labor management relations in some firms, the dominant
labor relations trend of the 1980s was one of accelerated declines in union membership,
escalating tensions and conflict between unions fighting for survival and legitimacy and
employers intent on either avoiding or minimizing the influence of unions. By the end of
the decade union membership in the private sector of the economy fell to less than 12
percent, the lowest point recorded since just prior to the Great Depression. Consequently,
the capacity of labor and management to work together in cooperative and innovative ways
likewise declined.
Employment security also appears to have lost ground as a priority in corporate
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decision-making in recent years. Firms such as IBM, Digital Equipment Corporation,
Hewlett Packard and other well known for their commitment to employment security were
forced by shifts in their product markets to turn to layoffs or equivalent means of
involuntary reductions in their workforce.
Meanwhile the role and status of labor and human resource policy within the federal
government also went in a direction opposite that called for by the rhetoric and
recommendations of these commissions. Despite the calls for expanded training and
innovation in labor management relations, in 1990 the federal budget for training was less
than half the level budgeted in 1980. By 1992 the only two small programs in the federal
government devoted to promoting labor management cooperation and innovation, (the
Bureau of Labor Management Relations and Cooperative Programs in the Department of
Labor and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service's grants to support innovative
labor-management joint programs) were eliminated.
Enforcement of safety and health policies also weakened in the 1980s. The budgets
and inspection staff of Occupational Safety and Health Administration were reduced in the
1980s and the process of setting new standards for exposure to toxic substances slowed
considerably (Noble, 1992). Even a bona fide crisis was not successful in producing a shift
in labor policy. In 1989 a major explosion in a petrochemical plant killed 23 workers and
injured 232. As a result the Congress requested Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) to commission an independent study of the alleged underlying cause
of this and other recent accidents in petrochemical plants. A central issue to be studied was
the claim that the increased use of poorly trained temporary contract workers to perform
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maintenance and related renovation work was increasing the risk of accidents in these
plants. Although the study confirmed that the current regulatory and management systems
in this industry were not effective in managing the risks associated with the use of contract
labor, OSHA lacked the independence from higher levels of the executive branch (in this
case the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to initiate any changes in the way it
regulated these employment relationships (Kochan, Wells, and Smith, 1992). While this is
only one isolated example, it is symbolic of the general decline in the stature and
independence and influence of the Department of Labor in national economic, social, and
employment policy debates. The Department has neither been led by experienced and
respected labor experts of the calibre of previous Secretaries from the War Labor Board
generation such as George Shultz or John Dunlop nor does it have the professional staff
required to provide the analytical support necessary to play an effective role in policy
making discussions within the government.
Thus, the current state of employment policy and practice is poorly matched to the
needs of the economy and workforce. Indeed, I believe we are facing a crisis in labor
policy and analysis at least as large as the challenges facing scholars and policy makers in
the years just prior to the beginning of the New Deal. If we are to carry on the legacy left
to us by earlier generations of industrial relations scholars we will need to meet this crisis
by providing the theoretically and empirically grounded principles that can serve as the
intellectual framework for a new national employment policy. The next section is devoted
to the development of such principles, starting with the enduring contributions of the
institutional economists who provided the intellectual foundations or principles guiding the
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New Deal labor policy.
The Institutional Foundations to Labor Policy
The first generation of institutional economists proposed an alternative view of the
labor market to the prevailing classical economics model, a view that provides an important
part of the intellectual justification for a more activist role for government policy in
employment relations than prevailed at that time. The essence of the institutional view was
(and remains) that the employment relationship is an ongoing economic and social
relationship in which employees build up property rights that need to be balanced against
the economic interests or property rights of employers. Employment transactions are not
one time exchanges of commodity goods but ongoing bargains involving exchanges of human
effort in return for current compensation and implicit promises of future economic security.
Moreover, the institutionalists viewed these relationships as what Walton and McKersie
(1965) labeled as "mixed motive" in nature, i.e.,they involved a mixture of conflicting and
common interests and thereby required both periodic, distributive negotiations and
integrative efforts to pursue joint gains. Like any relationship involving conflicting interests,
power plays a critical role in shaping outcomes of these negotiations, thus the need to assure
that power is reasonably balanced." Thus the early institutionalists believed government
should balance the power between the parties in ways that promoted periodic negotiations
and orderly resolution of the parties' conflicting interests.
The institutional model of labor markets further challenged a prevailing principle of
classical economics, namely that perfect competition would provide the socially optimal
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outcomes for labor market transactions. Instead, the institutionalists adopted a view first
articulated by the Webbs in their discussion of the higgling of the market (Webbs, 1897).
Competition to the Webbs meant price competition which in turn translated into factor cost
competition. Thus, labor is treated like a commodity, a factor of production, and a cost to
be minimized. Competitive market forces will therefore serve to drive out any "rents" that
labor power may create and thereby, if left unregulated by law and/or private institutions,
will drive down labor standards.
Given this view of the labor market and the problems identified by the careful
empirical research conducted by the first generation of institutional economists, it is not
surprising that the New Deal labor policies focused on the distributive side of the
employment relationship. Various labor standards (minimum wages, hours of work,
unemployment insurance, workers' compensation insurance, social security, etc.) set a floor
on working conditions while collective bargaining legislation strengthened workers' ability
to influence their conditions of employment. As such the New Deal policies reflected an
effort to institutionalize and regulate conflicting interests at the workplace.
Since the institutionalists viewed conflicting interests between workers and employers
as inherent and enduring features of employment relationships, the need for legislative
protection of labor standards and rights to organize are equally enduring through time.
Thus, the institutional legacy of industrial relations suggests a first principle for employment
policy:
Government is responsible for creating an environment and set of rules to redress
imbalances in power in employment relationships and to insure that enduring
conflicts of interests between workers and employers are resolved through
negotiations and basic worker rights are protected by labor standards.
10
III
While this remains an important first principle for employment policy, it is no longer
sufficient. The early institutionalists and the New Deal labor policies had little to say about
the integrative side of the employment relationship, i.e.,how public policy might encourage
the pursuit of mutual gains at the workplace. In part this reflected the lack of an adequate
theory of management, a weakness that continued to plague industrial relations theory for
years to come. But if the view of the importance of managerial choices and actions posited
in contemporary strategic choice models of industrial relations (Kochan, Katz, and
McKersie, 1986) is accurate, and if mutual gains' strategies are to be encouraged by policy
makers,this weakness must be addressed. Mutual gains strategies will only be chosen if
human resource considerations and employee interests can influence the critical managerial
choices and long term strategies of the firm.
Organization Governance. Management. and Employment Polic
To the extent management was considered at all in early industrial relations research
it was in the context of how to limit management's potential abuse of its power in
employment relationships. The institutionalists' traditional answer to this question was
through collective bargaining that specified worker and management rights and
responsibilities. Beyond this management retained its prerogatives to manage. Management
retained the rights to make strategic decisions affecting the enterprise; workers and their
unions were to be given rights to negotiate or file a grievance over management actions that
affected wages, hours, and working conditions. Thus, to the extent there was an implicit
theory of management in industrial relations, management was viewed through the eyes of
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its industrial relations representative.
Later industrial relations theorists clearly recognized and conceptualized the
intraorganizational bargaining (Slichter, Healy, and Livernash, 1960; Walton and McKersie,
1965; Dunlop, 1967) that occurs within management over labor policies. But even these
models viewed the process through the eyes of the industrial relations manager preparing
for or participating in collective bargaining. The burgeoning field of personnel management
took a similar "functional" approach to its domain by focusing on the specific activities and
techniques of recruitment, selection, compensation, performance appraisal, etc. Little
attention was given to conceptualizing the broader domain of strategic decision-making
regarding technology, investment, capital flows, or the governance structure of the firm since
these were perceived to lie well beyond the domain of labor policy. The essence of strategic
choice theory is that this level of management must now be incorporated into labor and
human resource theories and policies since it is at this level of the firm that the key
decisions are made that shape the outcomes of the employment relationship.
Research on these broader aspects of management fell to behavioral scientists who
lacked both as deep an understanding of the workings of labor markets and the values that
guided the institutionalists view of employment relations and public policy. Behavioralists
either ignored or denied the distributive side of the employment relationship and took as
their objective the search for managerial methods that integrated individual and
organizational interests (Mayo, 1933; McGregor, 1960).
But some branches of modern organization theory (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert
and March, 1963; Thompson, 1967; Child, 1972; Pfeffer, 1992; Pettigrew, 1973; Thomas,
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forthcoming) as well as industrial relations theory (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie, 1986)
explicitly model management not as a monolithic actor but as a coalition of competing
interests composed of multiple functional and hierarchical levels. While external markets,
technologies, and social forces (including government) influence managerial actions, these
external forces are not deterministic. Managers retain some discretion or range of choice
in shaping an organization's long term strategies and internal practices. Nor are top
managers simply neutral coordinators of different functional interests. Instead, managers
bring values and ideologies, functional interests, personal aspirations, and perceptual frames
of reference to their decision-making roles, all of which need to be taken into account in
shaping government policy. Finally, the 1980s brought home a new empirical reality to
students of management and employment relations, namely, that shareholder interests and
external financial institutions affect managerial behavior and strategy and outcomes of the
employment relationship (Useem and Gottlieb, 1992; Davis, 1992). All of these emerging
insights regarding managerial behavior and decision-making need to be taken into account
in shaping a modern approach to employment policy. The key question therefore is: How
do human resource and labor issues fit into this structure and process of strategic decision
making?
Human resources has historically ranked as one of the weakest functions within the
management structure of U.S. firms. The status of the personnel or human resources
function has risen and fallen over time. As far back as the 1920s Sumner Slichter (1919)
and Paul Douglas (1919) noted that personnel managers were finally coming into their own
and being viewed as important and influential within management as their colleagues in
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finance, marketing, and manufacturing. This same view dominated the rhetoric in the
personnel literature throughout the 1980s. Human resource executives were expected to
become strategic partners with top executives and line managers. But the relative ranking
of these executives has not fundamentally changed. In a recent small survey of high tech
firms in New England we found that human resources still ranked fourth out of five
managerial functions. Moreover, human resource executives continue rely on their ability
to establish "partnerships" with more powerful line executives or gain the confidence and
commitment of the top corporate executives to give voice and influence to human resource
policies within the firm (Freedman, 1990; Towers Perrin, 1991). As long as this is the
prevailing position of human resources in corporate governance and strategic decision-
making, this function will continue to occupy a relatively low and/or variable position of
power and influence.
Historically, human resource innovations come in sharp periods that coincide with
wars, social crises, union threats and/or major changes in government policy (Baron,
Dobbin, and Jennings, 1986; Jacoby, 1985; Kochan and Cappelli, 1984). As these external
threats mount, so too does the power of those human resource, industrial relations, or other
professionals within management who cope with the risks and potential threats to the
organization that these external pressures entail. The more permanent these pressures, the
more likely they are to result in lasting shifts in the influence of the professionals assigned
to cope with them within the firm. These professionals are most successful, however, when
they can translate these external pressures into mutual gains strategies (Cebon, 1992).
A counterpoint to this view of management dominated popular management research
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and writing in the 1980s. This view sees top executives as the key party shaping the culture,
values, and behavior of the firm, its managers, and its rank and file employees (Peters and
Waterman, 1982). The cultural school of management argues that modem executives had
both learned and internalized the view that "human resources are the firm's most important
asset" and therefore had become self-enlightened about the need to manage employees fairly
and to provide them with opportunities to influence their jobs, work environment, and
careers. The values of managers shifted from the days of the robber barons of the past
century to the culture conscious CEOs of today. Thus, union threats or government
standards are no longer needed because management will attend to employee interests.
This view of corporate governance and strategy making reflects an a-historical and
a-theoretical view of the modern corporation. Corporate executives must function as
coordinators of multiple interests but ultimately they are agents of shareholders. The legal
foundation of the American corporation rests on a premise that the fiduciary responsibility
and primary function of management is to maximize the financial interests of shareholders.
While since the writings of Berle and Means (1933) it has been recognized that managers
develop interests of their own and a separation of ownership and control often occurs, more
recently there has been a resurgence of shareholder interests through the development in
the 1980s of an active "market for corporate control." Shareholders, and outside bidders,
became interested in asserting their short term interests because top executives were thought
to have become complacent, stressing their own interests rather than the shareholders, and
insulating the corporation from the market. This led to corporate restructuring with a
vengeance in the 1980s (Doyle, 1990). More recently, the two leading business periodicals
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Business Week (1991) and the Wall Street Journal (1991) concluded that the culture
building CEOs of the past are being replaced by hard driving cost cutting executives who
are not afraid to come in cut employment and clean house.
Underlying these managerial behaviors lies a set of capital markets and financial
institutions that influence managerial time horizons and strategic decisions. Only recently,
however, have we begun to examine the relationships between these markets and institutions
and firm level labor and human resource strategies (Levine and Tyson, 1990; Porter,
forthcoming; Kochan and Osterman, forthcoming; Wever and Allen, 1992).
The key hypothesis emerging out of this literature is that U.S. capital markets and
institutions constrain managerial time horizons to focus on short term results. This in turn
leads managers to under-invest in activities or projects that have clear short term costs but
only long term payoffs. Investments in human resources and innovations in employment
practices fit this description. This area of research is only in its infancy but needs to be
pursued if we are to engage in a thoughtful and empirically grounded debate over the
appropriate role of human resource strategies in organizational governance and the role that
public policy plays in shaping that role.
Thus, a modern employment policy that seeks to encourage firms to pursue mutual
gains strategies must be based on a better informed model of the role of decision-making
within corporations. If the real decisions that affect long term employment relations are
made at the top levels of the corporate hierarchy rather than through collective bargaining
or within the personnel function of the corporation, if the human resource function
continues to occupy a junior partnership position in most organizational hierarchies, and if,
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as some argue, U.S. financial markets and institutions bias decision-making in favor of short
time horizons and cost controls rather than long term investments, human resource
considerations and employee interests are not likely to be effectively taken into account at
this level of decision making. The implication of this research is that one role for
government is to elevate and stabilize the otherwise weak and fluctuating influence
employee interests and human resource management concerns have in American
corporations.
This suggests a second principle for a modem theory and perspective on the role
of government in employment relations:
The ability of human resource managers to influence corporate strategies
historically is low in U.S. firms because of the legal doctrines governing the
American corporations. Decision making regarding any functional group is a
political process requiring significant influence. The influence of human resource
professionals rises and falls over time in response to changes n the degree of
external threat posed by labor market, government, or unions or other employee
representation institutions. Yet even within this range, the political influence of
human resources and/or employee interests remains low relative to other competing
interests of functions that are closer to the core concerns for maximizing shareholder
interests. Thus, one function of government policy is to elevate and institutionalize
the influence of human resource considerations and employee interests in the long
term strategic decisions and governance processes of the firm.
Govemment's Role in Diffusing Mutual Gains' Innovations
While the above discussion suggests that there are systematic internal organizational
barriers to sustained human resource innovations, a number of firms have appeared to be
exceptions to this pattern. Over the course of the past two decades firms such as IBM,
Polaroid, Digital Equipment Corporation, Xerox, and Hewlett Packard achieved reputations
for giving high priority to human resource considerations and employee interests. Their
policies generally fit the principles of a mutual commitment organization summarized at the
17
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outset of this paper. Yet despite the tremendous amount of favorable publicity these firms
received in the 1980s, their approaches have not spread to large numbers of other firms.
Instead, as their product markets became more competitive and the financial analysts
became more vocal in their concerns over the high costs of these human resource policies,
these firms experienced difficulties maintaining these policies. This suggests that the
external environment may also be producing systematic market failures that limit diffusion
of innovations across the economy and their sustainability within individual firms. As in
other cases of market failure, only an active role by the government to change the
environment will produce widespread diffusion.
Levine and Tyson (1990) outline several factors that contribute to a market failure
for human resource innovations: (1) volatility in product markets, (2) loose labor markets,
and (3) impatient capital markets. The basic principle at work here is simple. If all
employers cooperate and invest to upgrade and utilize the skills of the labor force and
provide greater employment security, all firms, their employees, and the national economy
will be better off. If one firm invests heavily and others don't the investor loses and
competitors that do not invest gain a cost advantage because some portion of the benefits
from the investment are lost to the external market. If no one invests, firms might be able
to escape the problem in the short run by competing on the basis of labor costs but
employees and society eventually suffer because productivity and living standards erode.
Eventually more job creating capital investment migrates to regions or countries with lower
labor costs. As a result the overall economy suffers from an under investment problem.
U.S. firms are particularly prone to such market failures because of the strong
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tradition of firm independence and autonomy embedded in the American culture and
ideology. Walton (1988) and Cole (1989) both identify the lack of industry or national
infrastructures for diffusing human resource innovations. Commons recognized this problem
over seventy years ago in his analysis of the effects of the expansion of the market on the
wages and labor standards of shoemakers (Commons, 1919). What is needed now is the
equivalent of the institutions that took wages out of competition in the post New Deal
system of collective bargaining. This then becomes an additional task for the government
and therefore suggests another principle for contemporary employment policy:
The ability of any individual firm to sustain high levels of investments in human
resource polices and innovations depends on the extent to which other firms in their
labor and product markets and supplier and customer network invest in similar
practices. The role of the government is to encourage and support diffusion of
human resource policies within individual firms that, if sustained and widely
adopted, can produce benefits for the macro economy and society.
The State as an Actor in Employment Policy
Any argument for a more activist role of government in employment policy must also
be well grounded in an understanding of the policy making and administrative processes
within government. This, however, is another area of weakness in industrial relations theory
and research. Too often researchers move directly to prescriptions for changes in national
policies without first building a positive theory of the role of the American state in
employment relations. Our own efforts to build a strategic choice model of industrial
relations has been criticized for failing to fully conceptualize the role of the state as an actor
in employment relations (Adams, 1991). While full development of such a theory is beyond
the scope of this paper, several points need to be made.
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First, similar to its position within American firms, the priority or influence of labor
and human resource policy within the federal government is likewise rather low. Thus, the
politics of policy making within the government must be taken into account in formulating
a viable national employment policy. Second, again as is the case within individual firms,
labor and human resource policies cannot stand alone. Instead these policies need to be
integrated into and contribute to broader national economic and social policy objectives and
strategies. A mutual gains strategy is equally essential for labor policy representatives in
national policy making as it is within individual firms. To be successful in this effort
requires both strong and respected advocates for employment policy within the economic
policy making community and deep technical and analytical support for these policy
arguments. Third, policy making influence within government requires the backing of a
strong external constituency. Fourth, since researchers have described the U.S. as a weak
state and one that is historically reluctant to initiate changes in labor policies (Hattam, 1990;
Stone, 1988; Klare, 1985), major changes in labor and employment policies only occur in
rare political and economic circumstances. If the past is any guide these circumstances arise
in times of severe economic, national security, or social crises--wartime, periods of high
inflation or unemployment, significant labor unrest, etc. These were the conditions that
were present both in the 1930s when the New Deal labor policies were enacted and in the
1960s when out of the urban crises emerged the state legislation granting collective
bargaining rights to public employees. Finally, just as modern theories of management do
not treat management as a monolithic actor, neither should we ignore the multiple interests




Since its establishment in 1913 the U.S. Department of Labor has served as the
central agency within the executive branch of government with responsibility for advising the
president on labor and employment policy matters. Yet throughout its history, and
especially in the past decade, the Labor Department has not been able to assert an
independent voice in policy making. Instead, historically it has been subordinate to other
Cabinet level agencies responsible for economic policy making. In recent years it has been
relegated to an even more subordinate position by the collapse of its external constituency
and by the degree of control over domestic and regulatory policy asserted by the Office of
Management and Budget. All Congressional testimony, administrative rules or regulations
or standards, new legislative proposals, and even data collection instruments must be
approved by OMB before the Labor Department (or other Cabinet agencies) can act. This
limits the freedom of the Department to bring its own professional judgement to bear on
policy issues within its substantive domain. Instead it must obtain approval for its initiatives
from the keeper of the budget and the watchdog for limiting the number and scope of
government regulations.
The decline in the status and influence of employment policy is both a cause and an
effect of decline in the influence of labor in society and at the level of the firm. As union
membership declined, the political influence of labor likewise declined. When this decline
crossed a threshold, perhaps with the defeat of the Labor Law Reform Bill in 1978 and/or
perhaps with the firing of the striking air traffic controllers by President Reagan in 1981,
perhaps when the nonunion sector became sufficiently large and viable alternative to
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employers, employers and government officials outside the narrow domains of labor policy
could deny labor policy makers or labor representatives the legitimacy they need to
participate in and influence issues of national policy. Political discourse could then label
labor as a "special interest" with a narrow institutional agenda.
This suggests the following principle regarding government as an actor in employment
policy:
For employment policy to be effective it must achieve voice and be integrated into
macro-economic and social policy making and administration. For it to achieve this
status and influence requires a broad and diverse set of external interests who
support and reinforce efforts and influence of employment policy officials in policy
making and administrative processes. Moreover, employment policy makers must
bring an independent and professional analytic capacity to bear into these policy
debates that is capable of identifying strategies for pursuing the joint objectives of
effective macro economic performance and improvement in labor and living
standards.
In summary, the contemporary challenge to government is to strengthen its internal
analytical capacity to play a more active role in employment affairs. But it must do so with
a substantive agenda and strategy that is human resource or market-enhancing--one that
encourages firms and employees to focus on the joint outcomes of improving
competitiveness of the enterprise and the economy through a high productivity and high
skills labor force. This means that within the firm, labor policy should serve to strengthen
the role of human resources in corporate strategy and governance, encourage development
of a long term perspective that treats employees as valuable assets, and recognizes the
importance of a high trust, cooperative culture for innovation and adaptation. Within the
government itself, these same principles need to be applied to the development and
administration of employment, economic, and social policies. That is, those responsible for
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labor or employment policy need to participate in the highest levels of macro-economic and
social policy making and decision-making and search for employment strategies and policy
instruments that can achieve joint goals of economic growth and competitiveness with high
labor and living standards. Labor standards and worker rights to effective representation
must continue to be protected but should be embedded in a broader employment and
economic policy and be responsive to the greater diversity in the workforce than traditional
regulatory and bargaining models have recognized.
Applying the Principles
At the outset of this paper it was noted that one of the legacies of prior generations
of industrial relations scholars was their ability to translate the broad theoretical and
normative principles guiding their work into practical policies. To be true to this legacy, we
need to go beyond the broad principles outlined above to suggest how they might be
applied. This task is taken up below.4
Specific Policy Initiatives
The policy initiatives proposed here start with a key labor and human resource
component to macro economic policies designed to foster sustained improvements in
productivity, move on to encourage mutual gains strategies within individual firms, and
4What follows is an updated and expanded version of the ideas first presented in a paper
with my colleague Robert McKersie at the First Regional International Industrial Relations




support the diffusion of these strategies across the economy to the point that they produce
benefits to the macro economy and society. But consistent with the longstanding view of
our field that effective employee representation is critical to both our democracy and our
economy, embedded in these proposals are reforms of labor law that will allow employees
to choose the forms of participation and representation that best allows them to influence
the issues that affect their interests, contribute to the long term performance of their
employer, and, consistent with the forms of empowerment proposed, take more
responsibility for their own long term development, safety, and economic security . Thus,
all of these recommendations have the effect of strengthening the influence of employees
as stakeholders in corporate governance and strategic decision-making.
Integrated Investment Strategies. Most macro economic strategies for improving long
term rates of productivity growth call for some type of tax or depreciation incentives to
encourage greater capital investment. This is the first point where employment policy should
be linked to macro economic policy. The evidence from the 1980s (MacDuffie and Krafcik,
1991; MacDuffie and Kochan, 1991) demonstrated that capital investments are more likely
to pay off when combined with investments in human resources and integrated with changes
in organizational practices designed to speed the implementation and utilization of the new
equipment. Thus, investment incentives should encourage enterprises to invest in both
hardware and human resources and put in place the governance and human resource
practices required for these investments to reach their full potential. Specifically, any
investment tax credit for hardware should be accompanied by evidence that employees have
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a voice in the technological choice and implementation process and by a human resource
development plan for deploying the new equipment. Moreover, tax credits should also be
available for investments in training and human resource development, provided that these
are investments that build general human capital.
Human Resource Councils. One way to insure that these investments build general,
transferable skills and serve to complement rather than substitute for the specific training
needed to perform current jobs is to involve those with the strongest direct interest in having
general skills in the design and administration of these policies. Thus, any tax credits for
training or human resource investments should have an accompanying requirement that a
representative cross section of the enterprise work force participate in this fashion. In a
previous paper Robert McKersie and I suggested that such human resource advisory councils
should have a broad and open ended mandate and agenda and thereby allow them to evolve
in a way that is suitable to the diverse circumstances found in different enterprises and
sectors of the economy. These councils can also take on responsibilities in other areas of
employment policy such as occupational safety and health where employees have both the
incentives and the potential to foster continuous improvements in practices and outcomes.
In some sectors enterprise level human resource investment strategies will need to
be supplemented by regional and/or occupational based training and development strategies
and institutions. Where there is heavy use of temporary or contract labor, or labor moves
across firm boundaries as in construction or clothing, investments in regional or industry
consortia for training and human resource development should be eligible for the same tax
credits made available for firm sponsored training, again provided that employees are
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represented in the design and administration of the training program. These regional
institutions can also begin to play the role of developing occupational certifications and
standards for the training provided in local educational institutions and thereby support
other initiatives to overcome the weaknesses that are now well documented and recognized
in the in the U.S. apprenticeship and related school-to-work transition processes (Batt and
Osterman, 1991.
Risk-Rewards Sharing and Governance. The incentives to establish new
participatory and representative structures and processes called for above should have a
positive effect of upgrading the voice of employees and human resource considerations in
the operations of American firms. But there is room for further experimentation in
organizational governance that flows from the experimental evidence of the past decade.
Federal tax policy has provided various incentives and inducements to encourage firms to
establish employee stock ownership plans (ESOPS). The evidence suggests, however, that
relatively few of these have given employees a voice in the governance of the corporation
when ESOPS are introduced (Blasi and Kruse, 1991). Therefore, tax incentives or other
policies that encourage ESOPS other forms of contingent compensation should provide for
employee rights to nominate or elect representatives to their corporate boards of directors.
This would further encourage the transformation of American corporations from entities
that focus on short term shareholder interests to ones that give greater weight to long run
investments and growth opportunities. Specifically, tax credits for ESOPs or deferred profit
sharing should only be provided if employees are provided equivalent representation on
corporate boards of directors, in a fashion that is consistent with how other investors and
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financial stakeholders gain representation on corporate boards. This would further stimulate
incentives for employees and firms to adopt contingent compensation programs that, if
diffused broadly, would achieve some of the macro-economic savings, growth, and
stabilization objectives identified by Weitzman and others (Weitzman, 1984; Weitzman and
Kruse, 1990).
Updating and Transforming Worker Rights to Representation . While the above
policy initiatives should help to create a climate that deepens trust at the workplace and
encourages the parties to pursue integrative, mutual gains strategies, employment policy
cannot continue to ignore the need to provide employees with basic rights to join the
employee organization of their choice. Not all employers will choose to compete in ways
that are consistent with the types of institutional arrangements proposed above. Distributive
issues will remain a central part of employment relationships even in those firms that do
choose to embark on a mutual gains strategy. Thus, labor law must provide employees with
an effective right to join the type of labor organization that best suits their circumstances.
Research conducted after the labor law reform debates of 1977-78 has demonstrated quite
conclusively that current labor law no longer serves this function well (see Lawler, 1990;
Weiler, 1990 for reviews of this evidence). But minor reforms that simply encourage the
parties to discover new tactics to escalate their rhetoric attacks on each other's motives and
integrity will not serve anyone's long term interests. Instead, union recognition procedures
need to be transformed in ways that avoid starting the relationship off on a protracted and
highly adversarial course. Effective reforms would include changes in the union recognition
process that encourage the parties to establish their own procedures for extending
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recognition voluntarily when new facilities or worksites are being planned, reduce delays in
elections and certification decisions where elections are held, strengthen the penalties
imposed on labor law violators so as to eliminate the economic incentives that now exist to
violate the law, and provide for first contract arbitration in situations where the parties are
unable to conclude these negotiations on their own following union certification.
The existence of human resource councils and effective procedures for establishing
union representation will create a healthy environment of competition among existing and
potentially new labor organizations and associations. In this type of policy environment
labor union leaders will compete with other professional groups to train and offer technical
assistance to human resource council representatives, much the same way that the CIO
offered a competing model to the AFL organizing principles in the 1930s and similar to the
ways union and works councils in Germany relate to each other (Wever and Allen, 1992).
Whether out of this competition arises a new national labor movement or a looser
confederation of local, regional, and enterprise associations (Heckscher, 1987; Kern and
Sabel, 1991) remains to be seen. But, as in Germany, the representative organizations that
will thrive in this environment are ones that develop skills and abilities to promote
development, utilization, and mobility of the human capital embodied in the labor force of
the future.
Deepening the Analytical Foundations of Employment Policy. Finally, a new
comprehensive employment policy will require considerable strengthening of the analytical
capacity of labor policy researchers within government and in the academic community.
Here we come full circle and return to the basic traditions that gave rise to our field and
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characterized the role of scholars from the days of the first generation of institutional
economists to the post War Labor Board generation of labor economists and industrial
relations specialists. Those who featured prominently in the administration of New Deal
labor policies had prior training, research based knowledge, and experience in the labor
markets and organizational practices of their day. The same can be said of the War Labor
Board generation, although some of this generation gained their knowledge of practice "on
the job" and then deepened their experience through active involvement in labor market and
industrial relations affairs that followed in the post war period.
A contemporary version of this generation of useful policy scholars and practitioners
need not simply reincarnate the institutional economists of the past. Instead, the tools of
modern theory and empirical techniques need to be blended with an appreciation of how
modern labor markets and organizations work. Well grounded and careful research of this
type has proven useful in various state legislative debates over the effects of public sector
impasse resolution alternatives (Stevens, 1966; Stern, et. al., 1975; Kochan, et al, 1979).
Similarly, careful studies of management and labor practices in key industries such as autos
(Katz, 1985; Womack, Jones, and Roos, 1990) have helped to focus debates over the ways
different production and human resource strategies work in practice. In both the public
sector and the auto industry examples, quantitative data and analysis were combined with
analysis of the institutional issues involved. Unfortunately, there is all to little such research
on national employment and labor policy issues.
The keys to producing this type of research lie in creating he data needed to support
application of modern analytic techniques to policy analysis and providing opportunities and
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incentives for scholars to participate in policy making and analysis. This will require
building national data bases capable of documenting and evaluating the contributions of
human resources and labor market policies to economic performance. Currently we have
labor cost employment cost and consumer price surveys but we have no equivalent- data base
for tracking the payoffs to investments in skills training, education, and cooperative
initiatives. A productivity, quality, and human resource innovations' data base is needed to
evaluate the effects of these policy initiatives and to convince skeptical managers, political
leaders, and macro-economic policy makers that these human resource investments and
policies pay off. Only by building a community of respected researchers who move in and
out of various government or advisory roles, can employment policy have the analytical
foundation and empirical justification needed to sustain the role envisioned for it here.
Nothing would serve to carry on the traditions of prior generations of institutional labor
economists in a more appropriate fashion.
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